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Abstract
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural
way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among
those that remain. Another intuitive way to obtain an allocation is to give objects to agents in the first place,
and to let agents exchange them as long as such “deals” are beneficial. This paper investigates these notions,
when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and
with other efficiency and fairness notions. In particular, we show that an allocation is sequenceable iff it is
optimal for a certain type of deals, namely cycle deals involving a single object. Furthermore, any Pareto-
optimal allocation is sequenceable, but not the converse. Regarding fairness, we show that an allocation can
be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibriumwith equal incomes is sequence-
able. To complete the picture, we showhow some domain restrictionsmay affect the relations between these
notions. Finally, we experimentally explore the links between the scales of efficiency and fairness.
Keywords: Multiagent Resource Allocation, Fair Division, Efficiency, Distributed Resource Allocation
1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate fair division of indivisible goods. In this problem, a set of indivisible ob-
jects or goods has to be allocated to a set of agents, taking into account the agents’ preferences about the
objects. This classical collective decisionmaking problem has plenty of practical applications, amongwhich
the allocation of space resources (Lemaître et al., 1999; Bianchessi et al., 2007), of tasks to workers in crowd-
sourcing market systems, papers to reviewers (Goldsmith and Sloan, 2007) or courses to students (Budish,
2011).
This problem can be tackled from two different perspectives. The first possibility is to resort to a benev-
olent entity in charge of collecting in a centralized way the preferences of all the agents. This entity then
computes an allocation that takes into account these preferences and satisfies some fairness (e.g. envy-
freeness) and efficiency (e.g. Pareto-optimality) criteria, or optimizes a well-chosen social welfare ordering.
The second possibility is to have a distributed point of view, e.g. by starting from an initial allocation and
letting the agents negotiate to swap their objects (Sandholm, 1998; Chevaleyre et al., 2005). A somewhat
intermediate approach consists in allocating the objects to the agents using a protocol, which allows to build
an allocation interactively by asking the agents a sequence of questions. Protocols are at the heart of works
mainly concerning the allocation of divisible resources (cake-cutting) (Brams and Taylor, 1996), but have
also been studied in the context of indivisible goods (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brams et al., 2012).
In this paper, we focus on a particular allocation protocol: sequences of sincere choices (also known as
picking sequences). This very simple protocol works as follows. A central authority chooses a sequence of
1This article is an extension of a paper presented at COMSOC (Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016b).
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agents before the protocol starts, having as many agents as the number of objects (some agents may ap-
pear several times in the sequence). Then, each agent appearing in the sequence is asked to choose in
turn one object among those that remain. For instance, according to the sequence 〈1, 2, 2, 1〉, agent 1 is
going to choose first, then agent 2 will pick two consecutive objects, and agent 1 will take the last ob-
ject. This protocol, actually used in a lot of everyday situations, has been studied for the first time by
Kohler and Chandrasekaran (1971). Later, Brams and Taylor (2000) have studied a particular version of
this protocol, namely alternating sequences, in which the sequence of agents is restricted to a balanced
(〈1, 2, 2, 1...〉) or strict (〈1, 2, 1, 2...〉) alternation of agents. Bouveret and Lang (2011) have further formal-
ized this protocol, whose properties (especially related to game theoretic aspects) have been characterized
(Kalinowski et al., 2013a,b). Finally, Aziz et al. (2015b) have studied the complexity of problems related
to finding whether a particular assignment (or bundle) is achievable by a particular class of picking se-
quences. In their work (not specifically dedicated to picking sequences) focusing on a situation where the
agents have ordinal preferences, Brams and King (2005) make an interesting link between this protocol and
Pareto-optimality, showing, among others, that picking sequences always result in a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion, but also that every Pareto-optimal allocation can be obtained in this way.
In this paper, we elaborate on these ideas and analyze the links between sequences, certain types of
deals among agents, and some efficiency and fairness properties, in a more general model in which the
agents have numerical additive preferences on the objects. Our main contributions are the following. We
give a formalization of the link between allocations and sequences of sincere choices, highlighting a simple
characterization of the sequenceability of an allocation (Section 3). Then, we show that in this slightly more
general framework than the one by Brams et al., surprisingly, Pareto-optimality and sequenceability are
not equivalent anymore (Section 4). By unveiling the connection between sequenceability and cycle deals
among agents (Section 5), we obtain a rich “scale of efficiency” that allows us to characterize the degree
of efficiency of a given allocation. Interestingly, some domain restrictions have significant effects on this
hierarchy (Section 6). We also highlight a link between sequenceability and another important economical
concept: the competitive equilibrium from equal income (CEEI). Another contribution is the experimental
exploration of the links between the scale of efficiency and fairness properties.
2. Model and Definitions
The aim of the fair division of indivisible goods, also called MultiAgent Resource Allocation (MARA),
is to allocate a finite set of objects O = {1, . . . ,m} to a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. A sub-allocation on
O′ ⊆ O is a vector −→π |O
′
= 〈π
|O′
1 , . . . , π
|O′
n 〉 of bundles of objects, such that ∀i, ∀j with i 6= j : π
|O′
i ∩ π
|O′
j = ∅
(a given object cannot be allocated to more than one agent) and
⋃
i∈N π
|O′
i = O
′ (all the objects fromO′ are
allocated). π|O
′
i ⊆ O
′ is called agent i’s share on O′. −→π |O
′′
is a sub-allocation of −→π |O
′
when π|O
′′
i ⊆ π
|O′
i for
each agent i. Any sub-allocation−→π |O on the entire set of objects will be denoted−→π and just called allocation.
Any satisfactory allocation must take into account the agents’ preferences on the objects. Here, we will
make the classical assumption that these preferences are numerically additive. Each agent i has a utility func-
tion ui : 2
O → R+ measuring her satisfaction ui(π) when she obtains share π, which is defined as follows:
ui(π)
def
=
∑
k∈pi
w(i, k),
where w(i, k) is the weight given by agent i to object k. This assumption, as restrictive as it may seem, is
made by a lot of authors (Lipton et al., 2004; Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006, for instance) and is considered as
a good compromise between expressivity and conciseness.
Definition 1. An instance of the additive multiagent resource allocation problem (add-MARA instance for
short) I = 〈N ,O, w〉 is a tuple with N and O as defined above and w : N × O → R+ is a mapping with w(i, k)
being the weight given by agent i to object k.
We say that the agents’ preferences are strict on objects if, for each agent i and each pair of objects k 6= l, we have
w(i, k) 6= w(i, l). Similarly, we say that the agents’ preferences are strict on shares if, for each agent i and each pair
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of shares π 6= π′, we have ui(π) 6= ui(π′). Note that preferences strict on shares entails preferences strict on objects;
the converse is false.
We will denote by P(I) the set of allocations for I .
The following definition will play a prominent role.
Definition 2. Given an agent i and a set of objects O, let best(O, i) = argmaxk∈O w(i, k) be the subset of objects
in O having the highest weight for agent i (such objects will be called top objects of i).
A (sub-)allocation−→π
|O′
is said frustrating if no agent receives one of her top objects in−→π |O
′
(formally: best(O′, i)∩
−→π
|O′
i = ∅ for each agent i), and non-frustrating otherwise.
In the following, wewill consider a particularway of allocating objects to agents: allocation by sequences
of sincere choices. Informally the agents are asked in turn, according to a predefined sequence, to choose
and pick a top object among the remaining ones.
Definition 3. Let I = 〈N ,O, w〉 be an add-MARA instance. A sequence of sincere choices (or simply sequence
when the context is clear) is a vector of Nm. We will denote by S(I) the set of possible sequences for the instance I .
Let −→σ ∈ S(I). −→σ is said to generate allocation −→π if and only if −→π can be obtained as a possible result of
the non-deterministic3 Algorithm 1 on input I and −→σ .
Algorithm 1: Execution of a sequence
Input: an instance I = 〈N ,O, w〉 and a sequence −→σ ∈ S(I)
Output: an allocation −→π ∈ P(I)
1
−→π ← empty allocation (such that ∀i ∈ N : πi = ∅);
2 O1 ← O;
3 for t from 1 tom do
4 i← σt;
5 choose object ot ∈ best(Ot, i) ;
6 πi ← πi ∪ {ot} ;
7 Ot+1 ← Ot \ {ot}
Definition 4. An allocation −→π is said to be sequenceable if there exists a sequence −→σ that generates −→π , and non-
sequenceable otherwise. For a given instance I, we will denote by s(I) the binary relation defined by (−→σ ,−→π ) ∈ s(I)
if and only if −→π can be generated by −→σ .
Example 1. Let I be the instance represented by the following weight matrix:4(
8 2 1
5 1 5
)
The binary relation s(I) between S(I) and P(I) can be graphically represented as follows:
S(I) → 〈1, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 2〉 〈1, 2, 1〉 〈1, 2, 2〉 〈2, 1, 1〉 〈2, 1, 2〉 〈2, 2, 1〉 〈2, 2, 2〉
P(I) → 〈123, ∅〉 〈12, 3〉 〈13, 2〉 〈1, 23〉 〈23, 1〉 〈2, 13〉 〈3, 12〉 〈∅, 123〉
3The algorithm contains an instruction choose splitting the control flow into several branches, building all the allocations generated
by−→σ .
4In this example and the following ones, we represent instances by a matrix where the value at row i and column k represents the
weight w(i, k). We also use ab... as a shorthand for {a, b, ...}.
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For instance, sequence 〈2, 1, 2〉 generates two possible allocations: 〈1, 23〉 and 〈2, 13〉, depending on whether agent
2 chooses object 1 or 3 that she both prefers. Allocation 〈12, 3〉 can be generated by three sequences. Allocations 〈13, 2〉
and 〈3, 12〉 are non-sequenceable.
For any instance I , |S(I)| = |P(I)| = nm. Note also that the number of objects allocated to an agent by
a sequence is the number of times the agent appears in the sequence.
The notion of frustrating allocation and sequenceability were already implicitly present in the work
by Brams and King (2005), and sequenceability has been extensively studied by Aziz et al. (2015b) with a
focus on sub-classes of sequences (e.g. alternating sequences). However, a fundamental difference is that in
our setting, the preferences might be non strict on objects, which entails that the same sequence can yield
different allocations (in the worst case, an exponential number), as Example 1 shows.
3. Sequenceable allocations
We have seen in Example 1 that some allocations are non-sequenceable. We will now formalize this
and give a precise characterization of sequenceable allocations that is, we will try to identify under which
conditions an allocation is achievable by the execution of a sequence of sincere choices. We first start by
noticing that in every sequenceable allocation, the first agent of the sequence gets a top object, so every
frustrating allocation is non-sequenceable. It is even possible to find a non-sequenceable allocation that
gives her top object to one agent (as allocation 〈13, 2〉 in Example 1) or even to all:
Example 2. Consider this instance: (
9 8 2 1
2 5 1 4
)
In the circled allocation −→π = 〈14, 23〉, every agent receives her top object. However, after objects 1 and 2 have
been allocated (they must be allocated first by all sequences generating −→π ), the dotted sub-allocation remains. This
sub-allocation is obviously non-sequenceable because it is frustrating. Hence −→π is not sequenceable either.
This property of containing a frustrating sub-allocation exactly characterizes the set of non-sequenceable
allocations:
Proposition 1. Let I = 〈N ,O, w〉 be an instance and −→π be an allocation of this instance. The two following
statements are equivalent:
(A) −→π is sequenceable.
(B) No sub-allocation of −→π is frustrating (in every sub-allocation, at least one agent receives a top object).
Proof. (B)⇒ (A). Let us suppose that for all subsets of objects O′ ⊆ O there is at least one agent obtaining
one of her top objects in −→π |O
′
. We will show that −→π is sequenceable. Let −→σ be a sequence of agents and
−→
O ∈ (2O)m be a sequence of sets of objects jointly defined as follows:
• O1 = O and σ1 is an agent that receives one of her top objects in −→π
|O1 ;
• Ot+1 = Ot \ {ot}, where ot ∈ best(Ot, σt) and σt is an agent that receives one of her top objects in
−→π
|Ot , for t ≥ 1.
From the assumption on −→π , we can check that the sequence −→σ is perfectly defined. Moreover,−→π is one
of the allocations generated by −→σ .
(A)⇒ (B) by contraposition. Let −→π be an allocation containing a frustrating sub-allocation −→π |O
′
. Sup-
pose that there exists a sequence−→σ generating−→π . We can notice that in a sequence of sincere choices, when
an object is allocated to an agent, all the objects that are strictly better for her have already been allocated
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at a previous step. Let k ∈ O′, and let i be the agent that receives k in −→π . Since −→π |O
′
is frustrating, there is
another object l ∈ O′ such thatw(i, l) > w(i, k). From the previous remark, l is necessarily allocated before k
in the execution of−→σ . We can deduce, from the same line of reasoning on l and agent j that receives it, that
there is another object p allocated before l in the execution of the sequence. The setO′ being finite, using the
same argument iteratively, we will necessarily find an object which has already been encountered before.
This leads to a cycle in the precedence relation of the objects in the execution of the sequence. Contradiction:
no sequence can thus generate −→π .
Beyond the fact that it characterizes a sequenceable allocation, the proof of Proposition 1 gives a practical
way of checking if an allocation is sequenceable, and, if it is the case, of computing a sequence that generates
this allocation.
Proposition 2. Let I = 〈N ,O, w〉 be an instance and −→π be an allocation of this instance. We can decide in time
O(n×m2) if −→π is sequenceable.
The proof is basedon the execution ofAlgorithm 2. This algorithm is similar in spirit to the one proposed
by Brams and King (2005) but Algorithm 2 is more general because (i) it can involve non-strict preferences
on objects, and (ii) it can conclude with non-sequenceability.
Proof. We show that Algorithm 2 returns a sequence−→σ generating the input allocation−→π if and only if there
is one. Suppose that the algorithm returns a sequence −→σ . Then, by definition of the sequence (in the loop
from line 2 to line 7), at each step t, i = σt can choose an object in πi, that is one of her top objects. Conversely,
suppose the algorithm returns NonSeq. Then, at a given step t, ∀i, best(O′, i) ∩ πi = ∅. By definition, −→π
|O′
is therefore, at this step, a frustrating sub-allocation of −→π . By Proposition 1, −→π is thus non-sequenceable.
The loop from line 2 to line 7 runs in timeO(n×m), because searching for the top objects in the preferences
of each agent is in O(m). This loop being executedm times, the algorithm runs in O(n×m2).
Algorithm 2: Sequencing an allocation
Input: I = 〈N ,O, w〉 and −→π ∈ P(I)
Output: a sequence −→σ generating −→π or NonSeq
1 (−→σ ,O′)← (〈〉,O);
2 for t from 1 tom do
3 if ∃i such that best(O′, i) ∩ πi 6= ∅ then
4 Append i to −→σ ;
5 let k ∈ best(O′, i) ∩ πi;
6 O′ ← O′ \ {k};
7 else return NonSeq ;
8 return −→σ ;
4. Pareto-optimality
An allocation is Pareto-optimal if there is no other allocation dominating it. In our context, allocation
−→π
′ dominates allocation −→π if for all agent i, ui(π′i) ≥ ui(πi) and uj(π
′
j) > uj(πj) for at least one agent j.
When an allocation is generated from a sequence, in some sense, a weak form of efficiency is applied to
build the allocation: each successive (picking) choice is “locally” optimal. This raises a natural question: is
every sequenceable allocation Pareto-optimal?
This question has already been extensively discussed independently by Aziz et al. (2016b) and in a pre-
vious version of this work (Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016b). We complete the discussion here to give more
insights about the implications of the previous results in our framework.
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Brams and King (2005, Proposition 1) prove the equivalence between sequenceability andPareto-optimality.
However, they have a different notion of Pareto-optimality, because the agents’ preferences are given as lin-
ear orders over objects. To be able to compare bundles, these preferences are lifted on subsets using the
responsive set extension ≻RS . This extension leaves many bundles incomparable and leads to define possible
and necessary Pareto-optimality. Brams and King’s notion is possible Pareto-optimality. Aziz et al. (2015a)
show that, given a linear order ≻ on objects and two bundles π and π′, π ≻RS π′ if and only if u(π) > u(π′)
for all additive utility functions u compatible with ≻ (that is, such that u(k) > u(l) if and only if k ≻ l).
This characterization of responsive dominance yields the following reinterpretation of Brams and King’s
result: an allocation −→π is sequenceable if and only if for each other allocation −→π ′, there is a set u1, . . . , un
of additive utility functions, respectively compatible with ≻1, . . . ,≻n such that ui(πi) > ui(πi′) for at least
one agent i.
The latter notion of Pareto-optimality is very weak, because (unlike in our context) the set of additive
utility functions is not fixed — we just have to find one that works. Under our stronger notion, the equiva-
lence between sequenceability and Pareto-optimality no longer holds.5
Example 3. Let us consider the following instance:(
5 4 2
8 2 1
)
The sequence 〈1, 2, 2〉 generates allocation A = 〈1, 23〉 giving utilities 〈5, 3〉. A is then sequenceable but it is
dominated by B = 〈23, 1〉, giving utilities 〈6, 8〉 (and generated by 〈2, 1, 1〉). Observe that, under ordinal linear
preferences, B would not dominate A, but they would be incomparable.
The last example shows that a sequence of sincere choices does not necessarily generate a Pareto-optimal
allocation. What about the converse? We can see, as a trivial corollary of the reinterpretation of Brams and
King’s result in our terminology, that the answer is positive if the preferences are strict on shares. The following
result is more general, because it holds even without this assumption:
Proposition 3 (Aziz et al., 2016b; Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016b). Every Pareto-optimal allocation is sequence-
able.
Before giving the formal proof, we illustrate it on a concrete example (Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016a,
Example 5).
Example 4. Let us consider the following instance:
W =

 † 12 15 †11 7 22 12 7 †15 † 11
15 † 20 9 2 1


The circled allocation −→π is not sequenceable: indeed, every sequence that could generate it should start with
〈3, 1, . . . 〉, leaving the frustrating sub-allocation −→ρ in a dotted box.
Let us now choose an arbitrary agent who does not receive a top object in−→ρ , for instance agent a1 = 1. Let o1 = 3
be her top object (of weight 11 in this case). The agent receiving o1 in
−→ρ is a2 = 2. This agent prefers object o2 = 4 (of
weight 15), held by a1, already encountered. We have built a cycle a2
o1−→ a1
o2−→ a2, in other words 2
3
−→ 1
4
−→ 2,
that tells us exactly how to build another sub-allocation dominating −→ρ . This sub-allocation can be built by replacing
in −→ρ the attributions (a1 ← o2)(a2 ← o1) by the attributions (a1 ← o1)(a2 ← o2). Hence, each agent involved in
the cycle obtains a strictly better object than the previous one. Doing the same substitutions in the initial allocation−→π
yields an allocation −→π ′ that dominates −→π (marked with † in the matrixW above).
5Actually, since it is known (de Keijzer et al., 2009; Aziz et al., 2016a) that testing Pareto-optimality with additive preferences in
coNP-complete, and that testing sequenceability is in P (Proposition 2), they cannot be equivalent unless P = coNP.
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Now we will give the formal proof.6
Proof. As stated in the example, wewill nowprove the contraposition of the proposition: every non-sequen-
ceable allocation is dominated. Let −→π be a non-sequenceable allocation. From Proposition 1, in a non-
sequenceable allocation, there is at least one frustratring sub-allocation. Let−→ρ be such a sub-allocation (that
can be −→π itself). We will, from −→ρ , build another sub-allocation dominating it. Let us choose an arbitrary
agent a1 involved in −→ρ , receiving an object not among her top ones in −→ρ . Let o1 be a top object of a1 in
−→ρ , and let a2 ( 6= a1) be the unique agent receiving it in −→ρ . Let o2 be a top object of a2. We can notice that
o2 6= o1 (otherwise a2 would obtain one of her top objects and −→ρ would not be frustrating). Let a3 be the
unique agent receiving o2 in −→ρ , and so on. Using this argument iteratively, we form a path starting from
a1 and alternating agents and objects, in which two successive agents and objects are distinct. Since the
number of agents and objects is finite, we will eventually encounter an agent which has been encountered
at a previous step of the path. Let ai be the first such agent and ok be the last object seen before her in the
sequence (ai is the unique agent receiving ok). We have built a cycle ai
ok−→ ak
ok−1
−→ ak−1 · · · ai+1
oi−→ ai in
which all the agents and objects are distinct, and that has at least two agents and two objects. From this cycle,
we can modify −→ρ to build a new sub-allocation by giving to each agent in the cycle a top object instead of
another less preferred object, all the agents not appearing in the cycle being left unchanged. More formally,
the following attributions in −→ρ (and hence in −→π ): (ai ← ok)(ai+1 ← oi) · · · (ak ← ok−1) are replaced by:
(ai ← oi)(ai+1 ← oi+1) · · · (ak ← ok) where (a← o)means that o is attributed to a. The same substitutions
operated in −→π yield an allocation −→π ′ that dominates −→π .
Corollary 1. No frustrating allocation can be Pareto-optimal (equivalently, in every Pareto-optimal allocation, at least
one agent receives a top object).
Proposition 3 implies that there exists, for a given instance, three classes of allocations: (1) non-sequenceable
(therefore non Pareto-optimal) allocations, (2) sequenceable but non Pareto-optimal allocations, and (3)
Pareto-optimal (hence sequenceable) allocations. These three classes define a “scale of efficiency” that can
be used to characterize the allocations. What is interesting and new here is the intermediate level. We will
see that this scale can be further detailed.
5. Cycle deals-optimality
Pareto-optimality can be thought as a reallocation of objects among agents using improving deals (Sandholm,
1998), as we have seen, to some extent, in the proof of Proposition 3. Trading cycles or cycle deals constitute a
sub-class of deals, which is classical and used, e.g., by Varian (1974, page 79) and Lipton et al. (2004, Lemma
2.2) in the context of envy-freeness. Trying to link efficiency concepts with various notions of deals is thus
a natural idea.
Definition 5. Let 〈N ,O, w〉 be an add-MARA instance and −→π be an allocation of this instance. A (N,M)-cycle
deal of −→π is a sequence of transfers of items d = 〈(i1,X1), . . . , (iN ,XN )〉, where, for each j, ij ∈ N ,Xj ⊆ πj , and
|Xj | ≤M . The allocation
−→π [← d] resulting from the application of d to −→π is defined as follows:
• π[← d]ij = πij \ Xj ∪ Xj−1 for j ∈ {2, . . . , N};
• π[← d]i1 = πi1 \ X1 ∪ XN ;
• π[← d]i = πi if i 6∈ {i1, . . . , iN}.
A cycle deal 〈(i1,X1), . . . , (iN ,XN )〉 will be written i1
X1−→ i2 . . . iN−1
XN−1
−→ iN
XN−→ i1.
6This proof is similar to the one by Brams and King (2005, Proposition 1, necessity). However we give it entirely because it is more
general and will be reused in Proposition 10.
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In other word, in a cycle deal (we omitN andM when they are not necessary to understand the context),
each agent gives a subset of at mostM items from her share to the next agent in the sequence and receives
in return a subset from the previous agent. (N, 1)-cycle deals will be denoted by N -cycle deals. 2-cycle
deals will be called swap-deals. Among these cycle deals, some are more interesting: those where each
agent improves her utility by trading objects. More formally, a deal d will be called weakly improving if
ui(π[← d]i) ≥ ui(πi) ∀i ∈ N with at least one of these inequalities being strict, and strictly improving if all
these inequalities are strict.
Intuitively, if it is possible to improve an allocation by applying an improving cycle deal, then it means
that this allocation is inefficient. Reallocating the items according to the deal will make everyone better-off.
It is thus natural to derive a concept of efficiency from this notion of cycle-deal.
Definition 6. An allocation is said to be >-(N,M)-Cycle Optimal (resp. ≥-(N,M)-Cycle Optimal) if it does not
admit any strictly (resp. weakly) improving (K,M)-cycle deal for anyK ≤ N .
We begin with easy observations. First, ≥-cycle optimality implies >-cycle optimality, and these two
notions become equivalent when the preferences are strict on shares. Moreover, restricting the size of the
cycles and the size of the bundles exchange yield less possible deals and hence lead to weaker optimality
notions. Note that for N ′ ≤ N and M ′ ≤ M >-(N,M)-cycle-optimality and ≥-(N ′,M ′)-cycle-optimality
are incomparable. These observations show that cycle-deal optimality notions form a (non-linear) hier-
archy of efficiency concepts of diverse strengths. The natural question is whether they can be related to
sequenceability and Pareto-optimality. Obviously, Pareto-optimality implies both >-cycle-optimality and
≥-cycle-optimality. An easy adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3 leads to the following stronger result:
Proposition 4. An allocation −→π is sequenceable if and only if it is >-n-cycle optimal (with n = |N |).
Proof. Let −→π be a non-sequenceable allocation. Then by Proposition 1, there is at least one frustrating sub-
allocation in−→π . Using the same line of arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3 we can build a>-k-cycle.
Hence−→π is not>-cycle optimal. Conversely, suppose that−→π is a>-k-cycle. Then obviously this cycle yields
an allocation that Pareto-dominates −→π .
The scale of efficiency introduced in Section 4 can then be refined with an intermediate hierarchy of >-
cycle optimality notions between sequenceable and non-sequenceable allocations. As for≥-cycle optimality,
it forms a parallel hierarchy between Pareto-optimal and non-sequenceable allocations.7
A corollary of Propositions 2 and 4 is that checking whether an allocation is >-n-cycle optimal can be
made in polynomial time (by checking whether it is sequenceable).
More generally, we can observe that checking whether an allocation is (k, k′)-cycle optimal can be done
by iterating over all k-uples of agents, and for each one iterating over all possible transfers involving less than
k′ objects.8 In total, there are k!
(
n
k
)
k-uples of agents (which is upper-bounded by nk+1). For each k-uple,
there are at most
(∑k′
k′′=0
(
m
k′′
))k
possible transfers, which is again upper-bounded by (1 +m)kk
′
. Hence,
in total, checking whether an allocation is (k, k′)-cycle optimal can be done in time O(nk+1 × (1 +m)kk
′
).
This is polynomial in n andm if both k and k′ are bounded (as for swap deals).
6. Restricted Domains
We now study the impact of several preference restrictions on the hierarchy of efficiency notions intro-
duced in Section 5.
7Note that ≥-CO and sequenceability are incomparable notions. There exist allocations which are ≥-swap optimal but not se-
quenceable and the other way around.
8This is sufficient to also run through all the cycles involving strictly less than k agents: such a cycle can be simulated just by
appending at the end of the cycle some agents whose role is just to pass the objects they receive to the next agent.
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Strict preferences on objects. When the preferences are strict on objects, then obviously every sequence gen-
erates exactly one allocation. The following proposition is stronger and shows that the reverse is also true:
Proposition 5. Preferences are strict on objects iff s(I) is a mapping from S(I) to P(I).
Proof. If preferences are strict on objects, then each agent has only one possible choice at her turn in the
sequence of sincere choices and hence every sequence generates one and only one allocation.
Conversely, if preferences are not strict on objects, at least one agent (suppose w.l.o.g. agent 1) gives the
same weight to two different objects. Suppose that there is at least t objects ranked above. Then obviously,
the following sequence 111...111︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+1 times
222...222︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−t−1 times
generates two allocations, depending on agent 1’s choice at step
t+ 1.
Same order preferences. We say that the agents have same order preferences if there is a permutation η : O 7→ O
such that for each agent i and each pair of objects k and l, if η(k) < η(l) then w(i, η(k)) ≥ w(i, η(l)).
Proposition 6. All the allocations of an instance with same order preferences are sequenceable (and actually cycle-deal
optimal). Conversely, if all the allocations of an instance are sequenceable, then this instance has same order preferences.
Proof. Let I be an instance with same order preferences, and let −→π be an arbitrary allocation. In every sub-
allocation of −→π at least one agent obtains a top object (because the preference order is the same among
agents) and hence cannot be frustrating. By Proposition 1, −→π is sequenceable.
Conversely, let us assume for contradiction that I is an instance not having same order preferences. Then
there are two distinct objects k and l and two distinct agents i and j such that w(i, k) ≥ w(j, k) and w(i, l) ≤
w(j, l), one of the two inequalities being strict (assume w.l.o.g. the first one). The sub-allocation −→π |{k,l}
such that π|{k,l}i = {l} and π
|{k,l}
j = {k} is frustrating. By Proposition 1, every allocation
−→π containing this
frustrating sub-allocation (hence such that l ∈ πi and k ∈ πj ) is non-sequenceable.
Let us now characterize the instances for which s(I) is a one-to-one correspondence.
Proposition 7. For a given instance, the following two statements are equivalent.
(A) Preferences are strict on objects and in the same order.
(B) The relation s(I) is a one-to-one correspondence.
The proof is a consequence of Propositions 5 and 6.
Single-peaked preferences. An interesting domain restriction are single-peakedpreferences (Black, 1948; Elkind et al.,
2016), which, beyond voting, is also relevant in resource allocation settings (Bade, 2017; Damamme et al.,
2015). Formally, in this context, single-peakness can be defined as follows.
There exists a linear order ⊲ over the set of objectsO. Let top(i) be the preferredobject of i. An agent i has
single-peaked preferences wrt. ⊲ if, for any two objects (a, b) ∈ O such that either top(i) ⊲ b ⊲ a or a ⊲ b ⊲ top(i)
(i.e. lying on the same “side” of the agent’s peak), it is the case that i prefers b over a.
Interestingly, when preferences are single-peaked, the hierarchy of N -cycle optimality collapses at the
second level:
Proposition 8. If all the preferences are single-peaked (and additive), then an allocation−→π is ≥-n-cycle optimal iff it
is swap-optimal.
Proof. (RevisitingDamamme et al. (2015)) First, note that≥-n-cycle optimality trivially implies swap-optimality.
Let us now show the conserve.
Let us consider for the sake of contradiction an allocation −→π that is swap-optimal and such that there
exists a≥-k-cycle µ, with k ≤ n. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that µ = 〈(1, {r1}) , . . . , (k, {rk})〉.
We show by induction on k, the length of µ, that such a cycle can not exist.
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Base case: k = 2 A 1-cycle of length k = 2 is a swap-deal but as−→π is swap-optimal, no improving swap-
deal exists in −→π hence the contradiction.
Induction step: Let us assume that for each k′ such that 2 ≤ k′ ≤ k − 1, no ≥-k′-cycle exists in −→π and let
us show that no cycle of length k exists.
To exhibit a contradictionwewill need to use the following necessary (Ballester and Haeringer, 2011): to
be single-peaked, a profileU needs to beworst-restricted, i.e. for any triple of resourcesR = (ra, rb, rc) ∈ O3
there always exists a resource rj ∈ R such that there exists an agent iwith rj /∈ argmink∈R w(i, k) (Sen, 1966).
Because µ is a ≥-k-cycle, for all agent i 6= 1 involved in µ we have ri−1 ≻i ri and rk ≻1 r1. As no ≥-k′-
cycle exists, with k′ < k, for all agents i 6= 1 involved in µ and for all resources r in µ, r 6= ri and r 6= ri−1,
we have ri ≻i r. Moreover for all resource r in µ, r 6= r1 and r 6= rk, we have r1 ≻1 r. If the preferences do
not respect these conditions, a ≥-k′-cycleexists with k′ < k.
Because the profile is worst-restricted, for all the triple of resources R in {r1, . . . , rk}, at most two re-
sources of R can be ranked last among R by the agents. Let us call rw one of these resources ranked last by
agent il and held by agent iw. Thanks to the previous paragraph, we know that best(O, iw) = rw−1 and so,
because her preferences are single-peaked, iw puts rw+1 in last position among rw−1, rw, rw+1. The same
holds for agent iw+1 who ranks rw−1 in last position among rw−1, rw, rw+1 (because top(iw+1) = rw). There-
fore when we focus only on the three resources rw−1, rw, rw+1, each of them is ranked last among them by
one agent which violates the condition of worst-restriction. The contradiction is set, no ≥-k-cycle exists in
−→π .
Together with Proposition 4, Proposition 8 gives another interpretation of sequenceability in this do-
main:
Corollary 2. If all the preferences are single-peaked (and additive), then an allocation −→π is sequenceable if and only
if it is swap-optimal.
Proposition 1 by Damamme et al. (2015) is much stronger than our Corollary 2, because it shows that
swap-optimality is actually equivalent to Pareto-efficiency when each agent receives a single resource. Unfortu-
nately, in our context where each agent can receive several items, this is no longer the case, as the following
example shows:
Example 5. Consider this instance, single-peaked with respect to 1 ⊲ · · · ⊲ 6:
 † 1 2 3 4 5 †61 †3 4 5 †6 2
1 2 †4 †5 6 3


The circled allocation is swap-optimal, but Pareto-dominated by the allocation marked with dags.
7. Envy-Freeness and CEEI
The use of sequence of sincere choices can also be motivated by the search for a fair allocation protocol.
We will focus on two fairness properties, envy-freeness and competitive equilibrium from equal income
and analyze their link with sequenceability. Envy-freeness (Tinbergen, 1953; Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974) is
probably one of the most prominent fairness properties:
Definition 7. Let I be an add-MARA instance and −→π be an allocation. −→π verifies the envy-freeness property (or
is simply envy-free), when ui(πi) ≥ ui(πj), ∀(i, j) ∈ N 2 (no agent strictly prefers the share of any other agent).
The notion of competitive equilibrium is an old andwell-known concept in economics (Walras, 1874; Fisher,
1892). If equal incomes are imposed among the stakeholders, this concept becomes the competitive equilib-
rium from equal incomes (Moulin, 2003), yielding a very strong fairness concept which has been recently
explored in artificial intelligence (Othman et al., 2010; Budish, 2011; Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016a).
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Definition 8. Let I = (N ,O, w) be an add-MARA instance, −→π an allocation, and −→p ∈ [0, 1]m a vector of prices.
A pair (−→π ,−→p ) is said to form a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) if
∀i ∈ N : πi ∈ argmaxpi⊆O
{
ui(π) :
∑
k∈pi
pk ≤ 1
}
.
In other words, πi is one of the maximal shares that i can buy with a budget of 1, given that the price of each object k
is pk.
We will say that allocation−→π satisfies the CEEI test (is a CEEI allocation for short) if there exists a vector−→p such
that (−→π ,−→p ) forms a CEEI.
As Bouveret and Lemaître (2016a) and Brânzei (2015) have shown, every CEEI allocation is envy-free in
the model we use. In this section, we investigate the question of whether an envy-free or CEEI allocation is
necessarily sequenceable. For envy-freeness, the answer is negative.
Proposition 9. There exists non-sequenceable envy-free allocations, even if the agents’ preferences are strict on shares.
Proof. A counterexample with strict preferences on shares is given in Example 4 above, for which we can
check that the circled allocation −→π is envy-free and non-sequenceable.
However, for CEEI, the answer is positive:
Proposition 10. Every CEEI allocation is sequenceable.
It was already known that every CEEI allocation is Pareto-optimal if the preferences are strict on shares
(Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016a). From Proposition 3, if the preferences are strict on shares, then every CEEI
allocation is sequenceable. But Proposition 10 is more general: no assumption is made on the strict order
on shares (nor on objects).
Note that a CEEI allocation can be ordinally necessary Pareto-dominated, as the following example
shows. 
 † 2 †3 3 22 3 † 4 1
0 4 2 †4


The circled allocation is CEEI (with prices 0.5, 1, 1, 0.5) but is ordinally necessary (hence also additively)
dominated by the allocation marked with †.
Proof. We will show that no allocation can be at the same time non-sequenceable and CEEI. Let −→π be a
non-sequenceable allocation. We can use the same terms and notations than in the proof of Proposition 3,
especially concerning the dominance cycle.
Let C be the set of agents concerned by the cycle. −→π contains the following shares:
πai = {ok} ∪ τi πai+1 = {oi} ∪ τi+1 .... πak = {ok−1} ∪ τk
whereas the allocation −→π ′ that dominates it, contains the following shares:
π′ai = {oi} ∪ τi π
′
ai+1
= {oi+1} ∪ τi+1 .... π
′
ak
= {ok} ∪ τk
the other shares being unchanged from −→π to −→π ′.
Suppose that −→π is CEEI. This allocation must satisfy two kinds of constraints. First, −→π must satisfy the
price constraint. If we write p(π)
def
=
∑
k∈pi pk, we have, ∀i ∈ C, p(πi) ≤ 1 (1).
Next, −→π must be optimal: every share having a higher utility for an agent than her share in −→π costs
strictly more than 1. Provided that ∀i ∈ C : ui(π′i) > ui(πi) (because
−→π
′ substitutes more preferred objects
to less preferred objects in −→π ), this constraint can be written as ∀i ∈ C, p(π′i) > 1 (2).
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By summing equations (1) and (2), provided that all shares are disjoint, we obtain
p(
⋃
j∈C
πj) ≤ |C| and p(
⋃
j∈C
π′j) > |C|
Yet,
⋃
j∈C πj =
⋃
i∈C π
′
j (because the allocation
−→π
′ is obtained from −→π by simply swapping objects between
agents in C). The two previous equations are contradictory.
8. Experiments
Wehave exhibited in Section 4 a “hierarchyof allocation efficiency”madeof several steps: Pareto-optimal
(PO), sequenceable (Seq), {cycle-deal-optimal}, non-sequenceable (–). A natural question is to know, for a
given instance, which proportion of allocations are located at each level of the scale. We give a first an-
swer by experimentally studying the distribution of allocations between the different levels. For cycle-deal
optimality, we focus on the simplest type of deals, namely, >-swap-deals. We thus have a linear scale of
efficiency concepts, from the strongest to the weakest: PO→ Seq→ Swap→ –. We also analyze the relation
between efficiency and various notions of fairness by linking this latter scale with the 6-level scale of fair-
ness introduced by Bouveret and Lemaître (2016a): CEEI → Envy-Freeness (EF) → min-max share (mFS)
→ proportionality (PFS)→ max-min share (MFS)→ –. We generate 50 add-MARA instances involving 3
agents-8 objects, using two different models. For both models, a set of weights are uniformly drawn in the
interval J0, 100K and the instances are then normalized. For the second model, these weights are reordered
afterwards to make the preferences single-peaked. For each instance, we generate all 6561 allocations, and
identify for each of them the highest level of fairness and efficiency satisfied. The average number of alloca-
tions with min-max interval is plotted as a box for each level on a logarithmic scale in Figure 1. The figure
also shows for each fairness criterion the proportion of allocations that satisfy each efficiency criterion, on
a linear scale.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of allocations by pair of (efficiency, fairness) criteria.
Note that some fairness and efficiency tests require to solve NP-hard or coNP-hard problems (MMS,
mMS, and PO tests). These tests are delegated to an external ILP solver. This is especially interesting for
the CEEI test which is known to be NP-hard (Brânzei, 2015), and for which, to the best of our knowledge,
no practical method had been described before. The implementation is available as a fully documented and
tested Free Python library.9
9Available at: https://gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/bouveres/fairdiv .
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We note several interesting facts. First, a majority of allocations do not have any efficiency nor fairness
property (first black bar on the left). Second, the distribution of allocations on the efficiency scale seems to
be related to the fairness criteria: a higher proportion of swap-optimal or sequenceable allocations are found
among envy-free allocations than among allocations that do not satisfy any fairness property, and for CEEI
allocations, there are even more Pareto-optimal allocations than just sequenceable ones. Lastly, the absence
of vertical bar for swap-optimality in the experiments concerning single-peaked preferences confirms the
results of Corollary 2: in this context, no allocation can be swap-optimal but not Sequenceable; hence, all
the allocations that are swap-optimal are contained in the bars concerning sequenceable or Pareto-optimal
allocations. Similarly, the absence of bars for swap-optimality and – (non-sequenceable) in both graphs
confirms the result of Proposition 10.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that picking sequences and cycle-deals can be reinterpreted to form a
rich hierarchy of efficiency concepts. Many interesting questions remain open, such as the complexity of
computing cycle-deals, the precise relation between Pareto-efficiency and ≥-cycle-optimality or the link
between efficiency concepts and social welfare. One could also think of further extending the efficiency
hierarchy by studying restrictions on possible sequences (e.g. alternating) or extending the types of deals
to non-cyclic ones.
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